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Many proba  bil  is  tic safety as  sess  ment stud  ies com  pleted to the date have dem  on  strated that
the risk deal  ing with low power and shut  down op  er  a  tion of nu  clear power plants is of  ten
com  pa  ra  ble with the risk of at-power op  er  a  tion, and the main con  tri  bu  tors to the  low power
and shut  down risk of  ten deal with hu  man fac  tors. Since the be  gin  ning of the nu  clear power
gen  er  a  tion, hu  man per  for  mance has been a very im  por  tant fac  tor in all phases of the plant
lifecycle: de sign, com mis sion ing, op er a tion, main te nance, sur veil lance, mod i fi ca tion, de com -
mis  sion  ing and dis  man  tling. The im  por  tance of this as  pect has been con  firmed by re  cent op  -
er at ing  ex pe ri ence.
This pa  per pro  vides the in  sights and con  clu  sions of a work  shop or  ga  nized in 2007 by the
IAEA and the Joint Re search Cen tre of the Eu ro pean Com mis sion, on Har mo ni za tion of low 
power and shut  down proba  bil  is  tic safety as  sess  ment for WWER nu  clear power plants. The
ma  jor ob  jec  tive of the work  shop was to pro  vide a com  par  i  son of the ap  proaches and the re  -
sults of hu  man re  li  abil  ity anal  y  ses and gain in  sights in the en  hanced han  dling of hu  man fac  -
tors.
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BACKGROUND
Proba bil is tic  safety  as sess ment  is  a  pow er ful
tech  nique that al  lows as  sess  ing the risks im  plied by
the  op er a tion  of  com plex  in dus trial  fa cil i ties,  and  it  is
fully ap  pli  ca  ble to nu  clear power plants (NPP). Many
util ity  or ga ni za tions  have  car ried  out  de tailed  proba -
bil  is  tic safety as  sess  ment (PSA) stud  ies to as  sess core
dam age  fre quency  (CDF)  and  ra dio ac tive  re lease  fre -
quency from their plants con  sid  er  ing var  i  ous haz  ard
sources** and plant op er a tional modes. The lat ter typ i -
cally in  cludes the op  er  a  tion with nom  i  nal power and
low power and the shut  down op  er  a  tional mode. 
Many PSA stud  ies have dem  on  strated that for
WWER the risk deal ing with low power and shut down 
(LPSD) op  er  a  tion is of  ten com  pa  ra  ble with the risk of
at-power op  er  a  tion or may ex  ceed it. Such fac  tors as
tak  ing mul  ti  ple com  po  nents out of ser  vice for main  te  -
nance, and changes in the con  fig  u  ra  tion of plant com  -
part ments  deal ing  with  re fu el ing  and  main te nance  ac -
tiv  i  ties may cause po  ten  tial chal  lenges to safety
fea tures. It has also been dem on strated that for the risk
deal ing  with  LPSD  op er a tion  the  main  con tri bu tors
are of  ten re  lated to hu  man fac  tors, what is a log  i  cal
con  se  quence of the fact that the hu  man el  e  ment in  ter  -
venes more in the re  lated or  ga  ni  za  tional pro  cesses
dur ing the low power and shut down op er a tion in com -
par  i  son with the full power op  er  a  tion.
By means of PSA, weak  nesses in hu  man per  for -
mance and hu man fac tors can be iden ti fied and, some -
times, the ap  pro  pri  ate cor  rec  tive ac  tions can be taken
with the aim of a fur  ther en  hance  ment of nu  clear
safety.
Pos si ble ap pli ca tions of the re sults of LPSD PSA 
in clude:
– de  ter  mi  na  tion of the ac  tual safety level dur  ing
shut down  states,
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* Cor re spond ing  au thor;  e-mail:  giustino.manna@ec.europa.eu
**  The  haz ards  con sid ered  typ i cally  are:  in ter nal  ini ti at ing  events
caused by ran dom com po nent fail ures and hu man er rors, in ter nal
events such as fires, floods, tur  bine mis  siles ini  ti  ated in  side the
plant, and ex  ter  nal events, both nat  u  ral and man-made.– risk-in formed  im prove ments  of  op er at ing  pro ce -
dures re  lat  ing to low power and shut  down states,
– better out  age plan  ning and bal  anc  ing be  tween ef  -
fec tive ness  and  safety,
– jus ti fi ca tion for mov ing some tests and pre ven tive
main  te  nance ac  tiv  i  ties from the out  age to the full
power  op er a tion,
– risk  mon i tor ing  for  out age,  and
– ra di a tion  pro tec tion  im prove ment.
In 2007, the IAEA launched the Re gional tech ni -
cal  co-op er a tion  (TC)  Pro ject  RER9087  ‘Har mo ni za -
tion of PSA & PSA Ap  pli  ca  tions’. The over  all ob  jec  -
tives of the pro  ject were:
– to en  hance and main  tain high level of nu  clear
safety in mem  ber states op  er  at  ing WWER re  ac  -
tors  by  strength en ing  their  ca pa bil i ties  for  con -
duct  ing and ap  ply  ing PSA, and
– to har  mo  nize and sup  port the de  vel  op  ment of PSA
and its uses by de  liv  er  ing state-of-the-art tech  nol  ogy,
com par ing  and  im prov ing  the  anal y ses  car ried  out
and  cre at ing  in fra struc tures  for  co-op er a tive  ef forts
be tween  rel e vant  or ga ni za tions  in  mem ber  states.
The  ul ti mate  goal  of  PSA  har mo ni za tion  ef fort
has been to iden  tify which dif  fer  ences in re  la  tion to
risk in  sights are driven by dif  fer  ences in de  sign fea  -
tures and op  er  a  tional prac  tices, and which ones are
due to dif  fer  ences in data and mod  el  ing ap  proaches.
For the lat  ter, the role of the best prac  tices should be
high lighted.
In the frame  work of the above pro  ject, the IAEA
or ga nized, in co-op er a tion with the In sti tute for En ergy
of the Joint Re  search Cen  ter of the Eu  ro  pean Com  mis  -
sion (JRC-IE), a work  shop on “Har  mo  ni  za  tion of Low
power  and  shut down  proba bil is tic  safety  as sess ment
for WWER NPP”. The work  shop was held on Oc  to  ber
29 – No  vem  ber 2, 2007, at the head  quar  ters of the Nu  -
clear  Reg u la tory  Au thor ity  of  the  Slo vak  Re pub lic  in
Bratislava, Slo  vak Re  pub  lic. This work  shop was the
sec  ond one in the se  ries of work  shops con  ducted on
har  mo ni  za  tion of LPSD PSA for WWER NPP in 2007;
one of the key top  ics was the anal  y  sis of the im  pact of
hu  man fac  tors on NPP safety [1]. Spe  cif  i  cally, the
work shop was aimed at con tin u ing the work on har mo -
ni  za  tion of PSA for WWER-type NPP for LPSD states
that was started at the first work  shop held at the same
place in March 2007 [2]).
The fo cus of the work shop was placed on the de -
tailed com  par  i  son of the ap  proaches and data used for
mod el ing sev eral im por tant ini ti a tors that, on the ba sis
of the re  sults of the first work  shop, ap  peared to be
ranked dif fer ently in dif fer ent PSA in terms of risk sig -
nif i cance. The aim was also to pro vide a more de tailed
com par i son of the re sults of hu man re li abil ity anal y sis
and gain in  sights in deal  ing with the hu  man fac  tors.
Twenty-two par  tic  i  pants from seven coun  tries
(Ar me nia, Bul garia, the Czech Re pub lic, Hungary, the 
Rus  sian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine) at  tended
the work  shop.
AP PROACH  FOR  PSA  COM PAR I SON
A ques  tion  naire was de  vel  oped in ad  vance and
sent to the par  tic  i  pants a few weeks be  fore the work  -
shop. The ques  tion  naire was aimed at col  lect  ing de  -
tailed  in for ma tion  on  ini ti at ing  event  fre quen cies,  hu -
man er  rors, and mod  el  ing de  tails for six se  lected
ini  ti  a  tors for WWER-440 and WWER-1000 plants.
The se lected ini ti a tors rep re sented the ma jor con tri bu -
tors to the CDF in PSA stud  ies for re  spec  tive WWER
plant units. These had been iden ti fied at the first work -
shop [2]. The orig  i  nal re  sponses can be found in An  -
nex III of ref. [1]. The in  for  ma  tion in ques  tion  naires
was ex  ten  sively used dur  ing the PSA com  par  i  son ac  -
tiv i ties  in  work ing  groups.
Two work  ing groups (WG) were es  tab  lished:
– WG#1:  “Com par i son  and  Har mo ni za tion  of
LPSD PSA for WWER-440 NPP”, and
– WG#2:  “Com par i son  and  Har mo ni za tion  of
LPSD PSA for WWER-1000 NPP”.
For both groups of WWER NPP the fol  low  ing
in for ma tion  was  col lected  for  the  six  ini ti a tors  rec og -
nized at the pre  vi  ous work  shop to be the ma  jor source
of dif  fer  ences in the risk pro  files:
– con tri bu tion to the to tal CDF for the ini ti a tor from
dif  fer  ent plant op  er  a  tional states (POS) [1, 2],
– twenty top min  i  mal cut sets (MCS)
*, and
– hu man  er rors  mod eled.
The fol low ing main anal y sis ar eas were cov ered
in the dis  cus  sions car  ried out in the WG par  tic  i  pat  ing
in  har mo ni za tion:
(1) com  par  i  son of the re  sults of anal  y  sis of se  lected
ini  ti  a  tors from LPSD PSA for WWER-440 NPP,
(2) comparison of the re  sults of anal  y  sis of se  lected
ini ti a tors from LPSD PSA for WWER-1000 NPP,
(3) ex plor ing  the  fea si bil ity  of  con sol i da tion  of  data
for  se lected  ini ti a tors  and  pro vid ing  ge neric  data
for WWER plants for LPSD modes
 **, and
(4) draw ing in sights on the re sults and spe cific fea tures 
of hu  man re  li  abil  ity anal  y  sis (HRA) for PSA for
LPSD states.
While  do ing  the com par i son  ex er cise,  the ac tual
de  sign dif  fer  ences were an  a  lyzed and taken into ac  -
count, as well as the fact that the orig i nal de signs were
not  iden ti cal.
SPE  CIFIC FEA  TURES OF HRA FOR LPSD PSA
The HRA done within a PSA for LPSD states has 
some spe  cific fea  tures that may be dif  fer  ent from the
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* A min  i  mal cut set is a com  bi  na  tion of an ini  ti  at  ing event and com  -
po nent fail ures and /or hu man er rors that could lead to un de sir able
con se quences (e. g. core dam age). It means that: (1) the given com -
bi na tion of events would cause core dam age, and (2) if any event is
se  lected and elim  i  nated from the min  i  mum cut set, the re  main  ing
sub  set of events does not cause core dam  age any  more. Each MCS
has a fre  quency as  sessed by PSA tech  nique.
**This topic is pre  sented in the ref. [1].fea  tures of HRA per  formed within an at-power PSA.
These new fea  tures may have both pos  i  tive and neg  a  -
tive im pact on the qual ity of op er a tors’ work. These in -
clude:
– dif  fer  ent spec  trum of time win  dows avail  able for
op er a tors  to  mit i gate  con se quences  (gen er ally,
low power and shut  down time win  dows are lon  -
ger),
– the level of de  tail of the pro  ce  dures used dur  ing
shut  down, which is less in com  par  i  son with the
pro  ce  dures used for full power op  er  a  tion,
– more  re quire ments  for  man ual  ac ti va tion  of  plant
equip  ment in re  sponse to the ini  ti  at  ing event due
to  un avail abil ity  of  some  emer gency  in ter locks,
– local de  tec  tion of ini  ti  at  ing events is avail  able in
many cases, and
– potentially very strong in  ter  ac  tion be  tween a hu  -
man-in duced ini ti a tor and the sub se quent op er a tor 
re sponse  (pos i tive  or  neg a tive  de pend en cies).
OVER VIEW  OF  HRA  QUAN TI FI CA TION
AP PROACHES
Dur  ing the work  shop, the em  pha  sis was put on
the com par i  son of the meth  od ol o gies used for HRA in
the LPSD PSA for WWER-440 NPP, in par  tic  u  lar re  -
gard ing  the  quan ti fi ca tion  of  the  prob a bil ity  of  oc cur -
rence of hu  man fail  ure events. An over  view is pre  -
sented in tab. 1.
Ad di tional  in for ma tion  con cern ing  the  ta ble
(1) Spe cific  meth od ol ogy  de vel oped  on  the  bases  of
THERP  tak ing  into  con sid er ation  per for mance
shap  ing fac  tors that are most rel  e  vant for the
wrong valve po  si  tion  ing and the mea  sure  ment of
miscalibration fail  ure.
(2) Sig nif i cantly  ini ti at ing  event  spe cific,  very  de -
tailed (and orig  i  nal) anal  y  sis made for some ini  ti  -
at ing  events.
(3) Sim  i  lar meth  od  ol  ogy to the full power case, some
spe  cific LPSD fea  tures needed to be ad  dressed
(long time win  dows, ab  sence of sig  nals, ab  sence
of  pro ce dures).
(4) The same con  trac  tor as for Bohunice V-1 plant.
(5) Ver  sion mod  i  fied by J.Vaurio (for fur  ther read  ing
[10, 11]).
(6) Spe  cific ver  sion of de  ci  sion tree set de  vel  oped by
VEIKI,  Bu da pest.
(7) Spe  cific ver  sion of de  ci  sion tree set de  vel  oped by
VEIKI,  Bu da pest,  tak ing  into  con sid er ation  data
re cords  from  sim u la tor  ex er cises.
(8) No LPSD was fin  ished at the time of the work  -
shop; the method was used in the full power PSA,
but the plant fore  saw to use the same method for
LPSD PSA.
(9) Since the in for ma tion has been taken from the full
power PSA, no hu  man in  duced ini  ti  a  tors were
iden ti fied and, there fore, no spe cific HRA method 
was deemed nec  es  sary for this part of HRA.
The fol  low  ing con  clu  sions can be made based
on tab. 1:
– a broad spec  trum of HRA quan  ti  fi  ca  tion meth  ods
was used by the in  di  vid  ual teams (seven meth  ods
in to  tal, con  sid  er  ing TRC and HCR to be the
same),
– the “old” THERP method is still very pop u lar, it is
used far most fre  quently; in ad  di  tion, the sec  ond
most pop  u  lar method ASEP can be seen as a ver  -
sion of THERP, too,
– the THERP/ASEP pair is the most used HRA meth  -
ods for anal  y  sis of pre-ac  ci  dent hu  man er  rors,
– for the most im  por  tant cat  e  gory of post-ac  ci  dent
hu man er rors, there is a big vari abil ity in the meth -
ods used, and
– TRC (HCR) is the most pop  u  lar method for
post-ac ci dent  hu man  er rors  anal y sis.
IM  PACT OF SYMP  TOM-BASED
PRO CE DURES
Now a days,  symp tom-based  pro ce dures  com -
monly pro vide sup port for most of op er a tors’ ac tiv i ties 
car  ried out in re  sponse to ini  ti  at  ing event oc  cur  rence,
not only dur  ing the full power op  er  a  tion, but in some
lim ited man ner in low power and shut down mode. The 
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Ta ble 1. Meth od ol o gies used for anal y sis and quan ti fi ca tion
of  hu man  er ror  prob a bil ity  (HEP)  for  the  in di vid ual
cat e go ries  of  hu man  ac tions
Plant
Type of human failure event
Pre-accident Initiator Post-accident
Armenian 2 THERP
* (8) 
[3, 4] ... (9) HCR
* [5],
ASEP
* (8)
Bohunice V-1 THERP THERP,
ASEP
TRC*,
THERP
Bohunice V-2 THERP (4) THERP,
ASEP (4)
TRC, THERP
(4)
Dukovany THERP (1)
THERP,
CREAM
* [6],
HEART
* [7],
Decision trees 
(2)
Decision trees 
+ ASEP (3)
Mochovce THERP,
ASEP [8]
THERP,
ASEP SLIM [9]
Paks ASEP (5) Decision trees 
(6)
Decision trees 
(7)
Kozloduy  NPP
Units 3,4            THERP Information
not available HCR
*  THERP – Tech  nique for hu  man er  ror rate pre  dic  tion; HCR – Hu  -
man  cog ni tive  re li abil ity;  HEART  –  Hu man  er ror   as sess ment  and
er ror  re duc tion  tech nique;  CREAM  –  cog ni tive  re li abil ity  and
error anal y sis method; TRC – time re li abil ity curves; ASEP – ac ci -
dent se quence  eval u a tion pro gram; SLIM  –  suc cess  like li hood  in -
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gen  eral aim of plan  ning plant strat  egy of re  sponse to
ini  ti  at  ing event oc  cur  rence (which is still be  ing an in  -
ter est ing  sub ject  for  ob jec tions  and  long  dis cus sions)
is to re  move cog  ni  tion-based ac  tiv  i  ties from the pro  -
file of con  trol room crew ac  tions per  formed un  der the
ac ci dent cir cum stances, the typ i cal at trib utes of which
are high stress and dy  nam  ics. The ef  fects of im  ple  -
men ta tion  of  symp tom-based  pro ce dures  for  LPSD
op  er  a  tion in terms of CDF value have been es  ti  mated
for dif fer ent plants. On the ba sis of PSA anal y sis, a re -
mark  able de  crease of CDF for all NPP for which
LPSD-PSA and symp tom-based pro ce dures for LPSD
were avail  able has been noted.
For two NPP among the par  tic  i  pants of the har  -
mo ni za tion pro ject, the CDF value “af ter” in cludes not 
only in  stal  la  tion of new symp  tom based pro  ce  dures,
but some mi  nor mod i fi ca tions, as well. Still, symp tom
based  pro ce dures  do  rep re sent a  dom i nant  con trib u tor
to CDF de creas ing. For two NPP a big im pact on CDF
value has been partly caused by the ef fect of ex tend ing
the scope of pro  ce  dures (feed and bleed added).
The val  ues of the CDF de  crease dif  fer sig  nif  i  -
cantly. The dif  fer  ence is such that it may en  cour  age
fur ther  work  ex plain ing  it,  i.  e.,  an  anal y sis  de fin ing
more  deeply  the  in di vid ual,  el e men tary  risk  de creas -
ing ef  fects of symp  tom based pro  ce  dures ex  is  tence.
For now, it can be pointed out that even the risk drop of
30% value is a very good achieve  ment – it means that
al  most as much as one third of the plant op  er  a  tion risk
was ad  dressed just with changes in pro  ce  dures, with  -
out any costly re  quire  ments to plant de  sign and hard  -
ware changes.
EX AM PLE  OF  COM PAR I SON  OF  THE
MOD EL ING  OF  HU MAN-IN DUCED  LOSS  OF
COOLANT ACCIDENT IN LPSD PSA FOR
WWER-440 NPP
This sec  tion il  lus  trates the ap  pli  ca  tion of the ap  -
proach for com par i son of se lected ini ti a tors across the
WWER NPP. In  for  ma  tion on the anal  y  sis pro  cess and
the re sults of the com par i son of mod el ling ap proaches
and the re sults for the ini ti at ing event “Hu man In duced 
LOCA” in WWER-440 NPP is pro  vided.
The event “Hu  man In  duced LOCA” has been
cho  sen as an ex  am  ple for the il  lus  tra  tion of the com  -
par i son pro cess be cause it has been shown to be one of
the most sig  nif  i  cant con  tri  bu  tors to the risk for LPSD
states for WWER-440 plants. The anal  y  sis re  sults for
other ini  ti  at  ing events can be found in ref. [1].
Gen  eral de  scrip  tion of the event
The loss of re  ac  tor cool  ant in  ven  tory can cause
the loss of re  sid  ual heat re  moval and at the same time
re duce  the  time  avail able  for  op er a tor  re cov ery.  Dur -
ing the plant eval u a tions when the op er a tors are low er -
ing the level, hu  man mis  takes could lead to a re  duced
in ven tory con di tion. Both plant pro ce dures and op er a -
tional ex  pe  ri  ence should be re  viewed to iden  tify these
ini ti at ing  events.
Over  view of the risk im  pact of the event
The  CDF,  con di tional  core  dam age  prob a bil ity
(CCDP) hav  ing hu  man-in  duced loss of cool  ant ac  ci  -
dent (LOCA) as an ini  ti  at  ing event (IE), and IE fre  -
quency  pre sented  re spec tively  the  fol low ing  mar gins,
for the con  sid  ered NPP:
CDF: (2.25E-06, 1.51E-05)
CCDP (3.59E-05, 2.02E-03)
IE fre  quency (4.57E-03, 6.72E-02)
It can be seen that the es  ti  ma  tions of IE fre  -
quency varies by ap  prox  i  mately one or  der of mag  ni  -
tude, i. e., in a sim  i  lar way as the fi  nal CDF, whereas
CCDP var  ies even by two or  ders of mag  ni  tude. This
great deal of vari a tion is typ i cal for the re sults ob tained 
by means of dif fer ent HRA meth ods for the anal y sis of
the same prob  lem. The high vari  ance of CCDP val  ues
may be caused by ap  pli  ca  tion of dif  fer  ent ap  proaches
to  eval u a tion  of  de pend ency  be tween  hu man  er rors
caus ing  an  ini ti at ing  event  (in ap pro pri ate  ac tions
caus  ing loss of pri  mary cir  cuit in  teg  rity) and hu  man
er  rors in re  sponse to the ini  ti  at  ing event oc  cur  rence
(the iden ti fi ca tion and lo cal iza tion of cool ant loss, iso -
la  tion or in  ter  rup  tion of the loss, etc.)
Es ti ma tion  of  IE  fre quency
In one NPP the quan ti fi ca tion of hu man-in duced
LOCA events was based on the HRA. It has been
found that all iden  ti  fied sce  nar  ios are LOCA that can
be iso  lated by re-clos  ing the er  ro  ne  ously opened
valve. The valves, mo  tor op  er  ated valves (MOV) or
man  ual valves, lo  cated on the bound  ary of the re  ac  tor
cool  ant sys  tem (RCS), which are closed and locked to
pre vent the bo ron di lu tion in the op er at ing mode 6 (ref
1), are not con  sid  ered to be er  ro  ne  ously open due to
the in  volved mea  sures and their in  de  pend  ent check  -
ing. The man in  duced LOCA events are con  sid  ered
only for the se  lected plant op  er  at  ing re  gimes [1].
In  an other  plant  HRA  quan ti fi ca tion  meth ods
tech nique  for  hu man  er ror  rate  pre dic tion,  de ci sion
trees (THERP, DT) were used for small LOCA, and
sta tis tics  and  di rect  nu mer i cal  es ti ma tion  based  on  the
plant spe cific ex pe ri  ence (pre cur sors) for a very small
LOCA.
In a third NPP, dur  ing the es  ti  ma  tion of the ini  ti  -
at  ing event fre  quen  cies, an anal  y  sis has been made in
each  plant  op er a tional  state  sep a rately.  The  iden ti fied
ef fects in clude (1) in ter nal causes and sim i lar, (2) er ro -
ne  ous change of the op  er  a  tional loop, (3) er  ro  ne  ousdrain  ing of the op  er  a  tional loop, (4) main  te  nance ac  -
tiv i ties,  (5)  er ro ne ous  sys tem  align ment,  (6)  heavy
load drop, and (7) other er ro ne ous in ter ac tions. The ef -
fects (2-5) and (7) rep re sent the po ten tial di rect hu man
or i gin of the ini ti at ing events. The hu man con tri bu tion
to the heavy load drop is also pos  si  ble but, in gen  eral,
this ini ti a tor is not con sid ered as a hu man in duced one.
Dom i nant  hu man  er rors
In more de tails, the dom i nant hu man er rors iden -
ti  fied in dif  fer  ent PSA pro  posed in the work  shop in  -
cluded the fol low ing sam ple of spe cific hu man er rors:
– op er a tor  fails  to  ini ti ate  bo ron  in jec tion,
– operator fails to ini  ti  ate com  po  nent cool  ing,
– operator fails to ini  ti  ate make-up of the re  fu  el  ing
cav ity,
– operator fails to com  pen  sate losses,
– no RCS make-up ini  ti  ated by the op  er  a  tor,
– operator fails to iso  late the man in  duced LOCA,
– op er a tor fails to vent the pri mary side of steam gen -
er a tor  and  re ac tor  vessel,
– operator fails to iden tify the loss of nat u ral cir cu la -
tion,
– plant staff fails to iso late the leak age fol low ing the 
loss  of  cool ing/nat u ral  cir cu la tion,
– plant staff fails to iso  late the leak  age be  fore the
loss of cool ing/nat u ral cir cu la tion (short time win -
dow),
– operator fails to iden  tify the leak  age be  fore the
loss  of  cool ing/nat u ral  cir cu la tion  (me dium  time
win dow),
– operator fails to pro vide long-term make-up of the
re fu el ling  pool,
– execution er  ror for wa  ter-wa  ter cool  ing of the re  -
ac tor,
– execution er  ror for start-up of RCS fill  ing pumps
(PZR),
– cognitive er  ror for start-up of low pressure
injection (LPI) sys  tem,
– operator fails to iden  tify a man-in  duced LOCA,
– op  er  a  tor fails to align wa  ter sup  ply into the re  ac  tor
via hydroaccumulator (HA) trains by the grav  ity
spill  ing of sup  pres  sion pool trays or by the pumps
with suc  tion from low pres  sure emer  gency core
cool ing  sys tem  tanks,
– sys  tem train un  avail  abil  ity due to a la  tent hu  man
er ror  in tro duced  dur ing  the  per formed  ac tiv i ties,
and
– small LOCA due to main te nance ac tiv i ties or er ro -
ne  ous sys  tem align  ment in spe  cific plant op  er  a  -
tion states.
In  sights de  rived from the con  sid  ered case
It was noted that one of the con  sid  ered NPP has
re li able  safety  sys tems  to  mit i gate  the  ac ci dent.  The
rea son  is  in  the  lim it ing  con di tions  for  op er a tion
(LCO). The NPP was, at the time of the work  shop, the
only plant where the LCO re  quire the avail  abil  ity of
safety trains to the max  i  mum pos  si  ble ex  tent, which
means that in the spe  cific op  er  at  ing modes the avail  -
abil  ity of two safety trains is re  quired. The third train
may be in pre ven tive main  te  nance. In the other plants,
only a sin  gle safety train is re  quired to be avail  able in
these op er at ing modes. Two trains can be in pre ven tive 
main te nance  and  the  es ti mated  prob a bil ity  that  two
trains be si  mul  ta  neously in main  te  nance is high (the
3rd train is pos  tu  lated to be in main  te  nance for the
whole du  ra  tion of POS).
If a plant re veals a sig nif i cant con tri bu tion of un -
avail  abil  ity of safety sys  tems due to planned main  te  -
nance, it is rec om mended to con trol the plant con fig  u -
ra tion  dur ing  main te nance  ac tiv i ties,  e.  g. us  ing risk
mon  i  tor. It is also rec  om  mended to con  sider as good
prac  tice the re  ported ap  proach which re  quires the
avail  abil  ity of safety trains to the max  i  mum pos  si  ble
ex tent.
A de tailed con sid er ation has been given in many
PSA  for  mod el ing  var i ous  op er a tor  ac tions.  At ten tion
should be paid mainly to the de  scrip  tion of ac  ci  dent
sce nar ios in volv ing op er a tor ac tions and to de pend en -
cies be  tween hu  man er  rors.
CON CLU SIONS  AND
REC OM MEN DA TIONS
The ul  ti  mate goal of the PSA har  mo  ni  za  tion ef  -
fort is to iden  tify which dif  fer  ences in re  la  tion to risk
in  sights are driven by dif  fer  ences in de  sign fea  tures
and op  er  a  tional prac  tices, and which ones are due to
dif  fer  ences in data and mod  el  ing ap  proaches; for the
lat  ter the best prac  tices should be high  lighted.
The ef  fort on LPSD PSA har  mo  ni  za  tion will be
es pe cially use ful for the plants that are plan ning or be -
ing cur  rently in the pro  cess of de  vel  op  ing a LPSD
PSA. Other coun  tries can ef  fec  tively use the out  come
of the IAEA/EC work  shops to ad  just their anal  y  ses
within a re fine ment programme or a next cy cle of PSA
up date.
The  fol low ing  in sights  and  rec om men da tions
from the work  shop are given:
(1) PSA scope
Not all WWER plants cover a full scope PSA.
Con  sid  er  ing the in  creas  ingly wide use of PSA in dif  -
fer  ent ap  pli  ca  tions, a full-scope PSA (i. e.  com pris ing
the risk as sess ment for var i ous haz ards and plant op er -
a tional modes) should be en cour aged and em pha sized.
(2) Sta  tus of PSA re  view
LPSD PSA for WWER re  ac  tors are lack  ing in  -
de pend ent peer and reg u la tory re view, which is seen to 
be an im  por  tant as  pect of ro  bust  ness of PSA. The re  -
views per  formed by the IAEA were mostly done for
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and ef  forts on pur  su  ing PSA re  view.
(3) Sta  tus of harmonization in
treatment of specific initiators
The  com par i son  of  spe cific  ini ti a tors  for  the
same type of NPP has showed that for some of the ana -
lysed  ini ti at ing  events  (e.  g.  hu man-in duced  LOCA,
loss of non-es  sen  tial ser  vice wa  ter for WWER-440),
the dif fer ences in the as sessed risk im pact of the events 
can be ex  plained by cer  tain dif  fer  ences in op  er  at  ing
prac  tices or de  sign, while for other events (e. g. re  ac  -
tiv ity ac ci  dents, heavy load drops), the dif fer  ences are
driven by the dif  fer  ences in the used ap  proaches and
data. The lat  ter re  quire a more de  tailed fur  ther anal  y  -
sis. Spe  cific con  clu  sions on the sta  tus of har  mo  ni  za  -
tion in the treat ment of spe cific ini ti at ing events can be
found in refs. [1] and [2].
(4)  Hu man  re li abil ity  anal y sis
One of the is  sues caus  ing a high con  tri  bu  tion of
LPSD states in the over  all risk pro  file is the hu  man
fac tor. Based on the com par i son of HRA from the PSA
in cluded in the scope of the work shop, a gen eral ob ser -
va  tion can be made that the hu  man er  ror prob  a  bil  ity
(HEP) value ranges in the LPSD stud  ies are driven
mainly by the dif  fer  ences among HRA ap  proaches
(dif fer ent teams car ry ing out HRA for dif fer ent plants) 
much more than by the dif  fer  ences amongst the in  di  -
vid  ual ac  ci  dent sce  nar  ios and plant fea  tures. It is sug  -
gested to con  duct a ded  i  cated co-ordinated re  search
pro  ject, a bench  mark ex  er  cise or a se  ries of fo  cused
work shops  to  pro mote  har mo ni za tion  of  HRA in the
PSA for WWER plants.
One of the in  sights is deal  ing with the im  prove  -
ment of nor  mal and emer  gency pro  ce  dures for LPSD
states that may sig  nif  i  cantly con  trib  ute to risk de  -
crease. A spe cific is sue that de serves fur ther har mo ni -
za  tion ef  fort is the mod  el  ing of the im  pact of symp  -
tom-based pro  ce  dures that have been im  ple  mented at
sev eral  NPP. The com  par  i  son ex  er  cise showed that a
sig nif i cant  vari a tion  ex isted  in  this  area.
(5)  Other  rec om men da tions  for
fur ther  re search
The  con tri bu tion  of  LPSD states in the over  all
risk pro  file (that in  cludes var  i  ous haz  ards and op  er  a  -
tional modes) ap  peared to be sig  nif  i  cant in all PSA
stud ies  for  WWER plants. The com  par  i  son of PSA
per  formed within the work  shop has re  vealed im  por  -
tant  el e ments  of  LPSD  PSA that be  ing treated dif  fer  -
ently in the meth  od  olog  i  cal sense some  times causes
sig nif i cant  dif fer ences  in  the  dis tri bu tion  of  the  risk
con tri bu tors. In the two work shops, the com par i son of
LPSD ini  ti  a  tors in  volved from 20 to 50 per  cent of the
cal cu lated  spe cific  core  dam age  fre quen cies.  To
achieve a better cov  er  age of the risk pro  file, more
meet  ings of sim  i  lar na  ture could be rec  om  mended.
The same har  mo  ni  za  tion ef  fort would be also use  ful
for in  ter  nal floods and in  ter  nal fires PSA for WWER
plants.
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ACRONYMS
ASEP –    ac ci dent  sequence  eval u a tion  pro gram
CCDP –  con  di  tional core dam  age probability
CDF –  core dam  age frequency
CREAM –  cog ni tive  re li abil ity  and  er ror  anal y sis
....method
DT –  de  ci  sion trees
HA –  hydroaccumulator
HCR –  hu  man cog  ni  tive reliability
HEART –  hu  man er  ror as  sess  ment and er  ror
    reduction tech  nique
HEP –  hu  man er  ror probability
HRA –    hu man  re li abil ity  analysis
IE –    ini ti at ing  event
JPC-IE –  Joint Researcs Cen tre of the Eu  ro  pean
,,,,Com mis sion
LCO –  lim  it  ing con  di  tion for operation
LOCA –  loss of cool  ant accident
LPI –  low pres  sure injection
LPSD –  low power and shutdown
MCS –  min  i  mal cut sets
MOV –  mo  tor op  er  ated valves
NPP –  nu  clear power plant
POS –  plant op  er  a  tional states
PSA –    proba bil is tic  safety  assesment
PZR –  RCS fill  ing pump
RCS –  re  ac  tor cool  ant system
SLIM –  suc  cess like  li  hood in  dex methodology
TC –  tech  ni  cal co-operation
THERP –   tech nique for hu man er ror rate prediction
TRC –  time re  li  abil  ity curves
WG –  work  ing group
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REZULTATI  ME\UNARODNE  INICIJATIVE  ZA  USKLA\IVAWE 
PROBABILISTI^KE  PROCENE  SIGURNOSTI  RADA  NUKLEARNE  ELEKTRANE 
PRI  NISKOJ  SNAZI  I  ISKQU^EWU
Mnoge studije zasnovane na probabilisti~koj proceni sigurnosti, do sada okon~ane,
pokazale su da je rizik upravqawa na niskoj snazi i iskqu~ewu ~esto uporediv sa rizikom
upravqawa na punoj snazi i da qudski faktori ~esto najvi{e doprinose ovom riziku. Od po~etka
rada  nuklearnih  elektrana,  humani  doprinos bio je veoma zna~ajan ~inilac u svim fazama
`ivotnog  ciklusa  elektrane: projektovawu, ukqu~avawu u rad, upravqawu, odr`avawu, nadzoru,
prilago|avawu,  dekomisiji  i  uklawawu.  Novije  iskustvo u upravqawu elektranom tako|e
potvr|uje  zna~aj  qudskog  faktora.
Ovaj rad ukazuje na sadr`aj i zakqu~ke seminara o Uskla|ivawu probabilisti~ke
procene sigurnosti rada VVER elektrana pri niskoj snazi i iskqu~ewu, organizovanog 2007.
godine od strane Me|unarodne agencije za atomsku energiju i Centra zdru`enog istra`ivawa
Evropske komisije. Glavni ciq seminara bio je da uporedi pristupe i rezultate analiza qudske
pouzdanosti i da pru`i uvide o poboq{anom upravqawu humanim ~iniocima.
Kqu~ne re~i:  probabilisti~ka procena sigurnosti, niska snaga i iskqu~ewe, analiza qudske
.......................... pouzdanosti, VVER, qudski faktor